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Loss of chance in medical negligence claims now a lost cause? 
 
The question whether the loss of chance of a better medical outcome in cases of medical negligence 
should be recognised as actionable damage is ‘a question which has divided courts and commentators 
throughout the common law world.’1  In April 2010, the High Court handed down its anticipated 
decision in the case of Tabet (by her Tutor Sheiban) v Gett (2010) 240 CLR 537.  The issue 
considered by the court was whether the appellant could claim in negligence for the loss of a chance 
of a better medical outcome.  This issue had not been considered by the High Court previously, the 
most relevant cases being Rufo v Hosking (2004) 61 NSWLR 678 and Gavalas v Singh (2001) 3 VLR 
404.  Claiming for a loss of chance in a personal injury action raises questions as to recognised 
damage and causation, and the members of the High Court considered both of these. 
 
Facts 
The appellant, aged six, was admitted to hospital on 11 January 2001 suffering from headaches and 
vomiting.  The respondent’s provisional diagnosis was that the appellant was suffering from 
chickenpox, meningitis or encephalititis.  The appellant remained in hospital and on 13 January she 
was observed to be unresponsive and staring and the respondent ordered a lumbar puncture to be 
performed.  The next day the appellant had a seizure and a CT scan and EEG were carried out, 
revealing that the appellant was suffering from a brain tumour.  She underwent an operation to 
remove the tumour but suffered irreversible brain damage.  The brain damage was the result of the 
seizure on 14 January, the tumour which had been growing for two years, the operation and other 
treatment.   
 
There was no allegation that the operation or other treatment was performed negligently.  The claim in 
negligence was based upon the allegation that the respondent had been negligent in failing to order a 
CT scan earlier and that this failure led to the appellant suffering the loss of a chance of a better 
medical outcome. 
 
At first instance it was held that had the CT scan been carried out earlier the brain tumour would have 
been detected and treated with steroids rather than with a lumbar puncture and this would have 
reduced the intracranial pressure.2  Studdert J found in favour of the appellant and assessed that the 
failure to order a CT scan contributed to 25% of the damage and of this there was a 40% loss of 
chance of a better medical outcome.  Damages were awarded based upon the 40% loss of chance of 
the 25% contribution, amounting to $610 000. 
 
On appeal, the New South Wales Court of Appeal found in favour of the respondent.  The court 
stressed the importance for evidence to demonstrate that the risk of harm resulting from the breach of 
the duty of care must be probable, not merely possible.  In the case before it the loss of chance of a 
better outcome was established only to be possible, and the approach of the trial judge was ‘plainly 
wrong’.3  The court referred to the decisions of Rufo v Hosking and Gavalas v Singh, stating that they 
should not be followed and that loss of chance in medical negligence claims required a reformulation 
of the law, which was a matter for the High Court.4 
 
Loss of chance and causation 
The principal ground of appeal to the High Court was that the Court of Appeal had erred in holding 
that the ‘causal effects of the clinical negligence of the respondent should be assessed on the balance 
of probabilities alone rather than, as at trial, “on the basis of loss of chance of a better outcome”’ (at 
[11]).  The High Court disagreed with this proposition as it would weaken the test for causation, 
Kiefel J noting at [151] that it ‘would require strong policy considerations to later the present 
                                                            
1 Gregg v Scott [2005] 2 AC 176, [10 per Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead. 
2 Tabot v Mansour [2007] NSWSC 36. 
3 Gett v Tabet (2009) 254 ALR 504, [389]. 
4 Ibid, [50]. 
requirement of proof of causation.’  Kiefel J explained at [111] that what the common law required 
was that: 
according to common experience, the more probable inference appearing from the evidence is 
that the defendant’s negligence caused the injury or harm. “More probable” means no more 
than that, upon a balance of probabilities, such an inference might reasonably be considered 
to have some greater degree of likelihood; it does not require certainty. 
 
The appellant was unable to establish that had the respondent carried out a CT scan earlier she would 
not have suffered brain damage, that is the ‘but for’ test was not satisfied on the evidence (at [114]).  
Hayne and Bell JJ, agreeing with Kiefel J, observed at [69] that: 
 
It need only be observed that the language of loss of chance should not be permitted to 
obscure the need to identify whether a plaintiff has proved that the defendant’s negligence 
was more probably than not a cause of damage (in the sense of detrimental difference). The 
language of possibilities (language that underlies the notion of loss of chance) should not be 
permitted to obscure the need to consider whether the possible adverse outcome has in fact 
come home, or will more probably than not do so. 
 
The medical evidence was that it was purely speculative guesswork whether steroid treatment would 
have created a chance that the appellant would not have suffered brain damage to the same extent as 
she did (at [94]).   Kiefel J noted at [143] that by expressing the loss claimed as the lost chance of a 
better medical outcome,  itself recognises that standard of proof for causation cannot be met as ‘what 
is involved are mere possibilities’.  To recognise a possibility of damage occurring for causation 
would lower the standard of proof requiring ‘a fundamental change to the law of negligence’ (at 
[152]).  As Gummow ACJ stated at [59] (Hayne and Bell JJ agreeing at [68]): 
 
the traditional approach in personal injury cases represents the striking by the law of a balance 
between the competing interests of the parties, and the substitution of the loss of a chance as 
the actionable damage represents a shift in that balance towards claimants. 
 
An alteration of the standard of proof for causation requires strong policy arguments, and the court 
was not convinced there were valid arguments.  At [102] Crennan J stated: 
 
Policy considerations which tell against altering the present requirement of proof of causation 
in cases of medical negligence include the prospect of thereby encouraging defensive 
medicine, the impact of that on the Medicare system and private medical insurance schemes 
and the impact of any change to the basis of liability on professional liability insurance of 
medical practitioners. From the present vantage point, the alteration to the common law urged 
by the appellant is radical, and not incremental, and is therefore the kind of change to the 
common law which is, generally speaking, the business of Parliament. 
 
Loss of chance as damage 
The appellant relied upon the approach taken by courts in the United States and France (at [120]) and 
argued that recognising the loss of chance of a better medical outcome only required a change as to 
the type of damage which may result from medical negligence (at [121]).   
 
Loss of a commercial opportunity is recognised as a form of damage in Australia5 and the appellant 
argued that by analogy a person has an interest in their medical outcome similar to a person having an 
interest in a commercial outcome (at [122]).  The members of the court disagreed with this analogy.  
At [46] Gummow ACJ stated: 
 
It should be said immediately that the principles dealing with recovery of damages for breach 
of contract offer no appropriate analogy. The action for breach of contract lies upon the 
                                                            
5 Sellars v Adelaide Petroleum NL (1994) 179 CLR 332. 
occurrence of breach, but that in negligence lies only if and when damage is sustained. ...  in a 
negligence action, unlike an action in contract, the existence and causation of compensable 
loss cannot be established by reference to breach of an antecedent promise to afford an 
opportunity. 
 
Kiefel J pointed out at [124] that a ‘commercial interest lost may readily be seen to be of value itself.  
The same cannot be said of a chance if a better medical outcome or a person’s interest in it.’  Her 
Honour went on to state at [124]: 
 
So long as an opportunity provides a substantial and not merely a speculative prospect of 
acquiring a benefit, it can be regarded as of value and therefore loss or damage (Sellars at 
364). A loss of a chance of a better medical outcome cannot be regarded in this way. As the 
assessment of damages in this case shows, the only value given to it is derived from the final, 
physical, damage. 
 
In considering whether loss of chance was harm independent of the physical harm suffered by the 
appellant was examined by Kiefel J with reference to the academic writing of Professor Khoury.6  
Khoury argues that if loss of chance was classified an independent harm, defendants would be liable 
even if no loss was suffered by the plaintiff.  At [130] Kiefel J refers to the example given in the 
Digest if European Tort Law7where a delay in treatment reduces the chance of healing by 40%, but by 
the time of the trial the plaintiff has in fact healed.  Her Honour explains, that ‘[b]ecause the loss of 
the chance is the relevant damage, in theory a claim may be made as soon as the chance is lost or 
reduced.’ 
 
Conclusion 
All members of the court were of the opinion that to accept that the loss of chance of a better medical 
outcome as actionable damage would require a change in the law of negligence and such a change 
was, as described by Crennan J at [102], ‘radical’. 
 
In Tabet v Gett the High Court did not expressly state that claims for the loss of chance of a better 
medical outcome were not actionable.  In fact, at [27], Gummow ACJ states: 
 
the appeal to this court must fail. However, this outcome will not require acceptance in 
absolute terms of a general proposition that destruction of the chance of obtaining a benefit or 
avoiding a harm can never be regarded as supplying that damage which is the gist of an action 
in negligence. 
 
Heydon J examined the issue of causation in great detail and at [97] concluded that ‘[t]he question is 
controversial among lawyers and in other cases, but as between the plaintiff and the defendant in this 
case the controversy has turned out to lack concreteness. For them it has become moot’ (emphasis 
added). 
 
The emphasis of this decision is on the fact that the appellant could not establish that had the CT scan 
been carried out earlier they would not have suffered the brain damage that they did.  Causation 
appears to be an insurmountable hurdle for loss of chance claims in medical negligence, but the court 
may have left the question open for future cases with more solid evidence.   
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